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Vehicular GPS Surveillance: The Death of Autonomy 
and Anonymity or a Variation on the Status Quo? 
Jacob Peterson  
I. INTRODUCTION 
A healthy mistrust of government is engrained in our national 
psyche. From our days as a British colony, we have always been 
wary of expanding government, with a near reflexive resistance to 
any infringement upon personal autonomy. The Fourth Amendment 
embodies this sentiment, erecting a legal fortress to protect our basic 
individual freedom: ―The right of people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated . . . but upon probable cause . . . .‖1 
This barrier, however formidable, has been eroded by an equally 
fundamental concern: the prosecution of crime. Throughout the 
twentieth century, rapidly evolving technology has defined a large 
part of the Fourth Amendment debate framed by these two 
considerations. The warrantless use of GPS tracking technology by 
law enforcement is one of the latest developments and the subject of 
recent debate.   
Relatively cheap, commercially available GPS vehicle tracking 
devices can be purchased for under $250 and can track vehicle 
movements for weeks at a time.
2
 Such technology provides a 
 
  J.D. Candidate (2012), Washington University School of Law; B.A. (2009), Washburn 
University. I thank my fiancée, Leah Meier, for all of her patience and boundless 
encouragement throughout both law school and college—I simply could not have done it 
without her. I would also like to thank my family for their emotional support and for ensuring 
that I had the means to make it through school. Lastly, I want to thank Professor William 
Schroeder for his advice as this note moved to publication. 
 1. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  
 2. GPS Tracking Key Pro, LAND AIR SEA, http://www.landairsea.com/gps-tracking-
systems/gps-tracking.html (last visited Mar. 5, 2012). The $250 estimate represents the price for 
a typical consumer model. See LandAirSea Tracking Key Pro Micro GPS Passive Tracking 
System, J&R, http://www.jr.com/landairsea/pe/LNA_LAS1507/ (last visited on Apr. 9, 2012); 
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powerful yet cost effective means for law enforcement to track the 
location of a suspect. It requires little in the sense of upfront expense 
or in ongoing maintenance efforts. Moreover, GPS tracking devices 
are now relatively small,
3
 making them difficult to detect in addition 
to being more effective and less visible than an officer physically 
trailing a suspect on foot or in a squad car.  
The Supreme Court in United States v. Jones recently—and 
unanimously—declared unconstitutional the use of GPS tracking 
devices to monitor vehicle movements by warrantlessly installing 
such devices on vehicles.
4
 The unanimity of the decision, however, is 
incredibly misleading since the Fourth Amendment doctrine 
underpinning the majority‘s opinion and the two concurrences are 
vastly different, leading to incredibly different consequences by 
extension.  
The opinion of the Court written by Justice Antonin Scalia, on the 
one hand, focuses on the trespassory nature of installing an external 
GPS to a vehicle, effectively holding that vehicles are ―effects‖ or 
constitutionally protected areas under the Search and Seizure Clause; 
therefore a warrant is required before tracking devices can be 
installed.
5
 Justice Scalia‘s reasoning—while appealing for its 
clarity—is nothing more than an analytical punt which avoids the 
thorny issues posed by GPS tracking. As Justice Samuel Alito asserts 
in his concurrence, it is not the government‘s use of personal property 
(in a very technical and limited sense) that is most concerning about 
GPS tracking, but it is the information gathered by such GPS 
tracking that is truly troublesome.
6
 Moreover, Justice Alito incisively 
points out that the majority‘s narrow holding can be factually 
distinguished in a very trivial fashion, further undermining the 
strength of their reasoning.
7
 
 
GPS Tracking Systems, LAND AIR SEA, http://www.landairsea.com/gps-tracking-systems/index 
.html (last visited Mar. 5, 2012).  
 3. See GPS Tracking Key Pro, supra note 2.  
 4. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949, 954 (2012) (reserving the question of 
warrantless GPS tracking where physical installation of a GPS device is not required).  
 5. Id. at 949, 952–53 (stating that ―[b]y attaching the device to the Jeep, officers 
encroached on a protected area,‖ and referring to vehicles as ―effects‖). 
 6. See id. at 957–58, 961 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 7. Id. at 961–62 (reasoning that the holding of the majority would be different if (a) the 
device had been installed with the permission of the person possessing the car, who had then 
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As Justice Alito contends, the primary concern about continuous 
tracking should be the inferences that can be made through the 
aggregation of location data:  
[A] single trip to a gynecologist‘s office tells little about a 
woman, but that trip followed a few weeks later by a visit to a 
baby supply store tells a different story. A person who knows 
all of another‘s travels can deduce whether he is a weekly 
church goer, a heavy drinker, a regular at the gym, an 
unfaithful husband, an outpatient receiving medical treatment, 
an associate of particular individuals or political groups—and 
not just one such fact about a person, but all such facts.
8
 
As illustrated above, long-term monitoring can reveal deeply 
personal information that many would prefer and expect to remain 
private. As an autonomy-loving society, allowing such monitoring to 
continue unchecked—even for well-intentioned law enforcement 
reasons—could significantly affect our personal independence and 
the government‘s relationship with its individual citizens.9 
 What is the solution to firmly address the problems of long-term 
monitoring? This Note posits that reasonable suspicion as a threshold 
requirement for all warrantless vehicular GPS tracking, with a strict 
two-week time limitation, would squarely and uniformly address this 
Fourth Amendment issue. Substantially more lax than probable 
cause, this low level of justification would be sufficient to curb 
concerns about capricious or even ubiquitous tracking, while still 
enabling law enforcement to utilize GPS early in investigations, 
maximizing its usefulness. Furthermore, the relatively short time 
limitation will minimize intrusion upon individual privacy. 
Part II of this Note outlines the pertinent Fourth amendment 
history both to show how the search warrant requirement is 
 
given possession to the defendant or (b) the police accessed a tracking system that was 
previously installed on the vehicle).  
 8. Maynard v. United States, 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010), rev’d sub nom. United 
States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). The aggregation of individual pieces of information to 
form a more comprehensive picture is commonly referred to as the ―mosaic theory.‖ E.g., Id. at 
562; David E. Pozen, The Mosaic Theory, National Security, and the Freedom of Information 
Act, 115 YALE L.J. 628, 630 (2005).  
 9. See infra Part III.C. 
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constitutionally framed and to address pertinent decisions regarding 
tracking technology. However, because Jones fails to address the 
important Fourth Amendment implications of GPS tracking, it is 
easily distinguishable, and this Note‘s analysis of Jones focuses on 
the more helpful contributions of Justice Samuel Alito‘s and Justice 
Sonia Sotomayor‘s concurrences.  
Part III analyzes the holdings of pertinent cases and scholarship to 
illustrate that GPS tracking does not have a clear solution either in 
favor of requiring a warrant based upon probable cause or unchecked, 
warrantless tracking. Finally, Part IV argues that a compromise 
between the two opposing views—allowing a tracking device to be 
used without a warrant based upon reasonable suspicion for a limited 
time—would accommodate the competing concerns surrounding this 
issue. 
II. FOURTH AMENDMENT BACKGROUND 
The Fourth Amendment provides that the ―right of the people to 
be secure . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause . . . 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized.‖10 The crux of Fourth Amendment ―unreasonable 
search‖ jurisprudence typically rests upon the action‘s classification 
as a ―search‖ alone: warrantless searches are, as a general matter, 
unconstitutional.
11
 Furthermore, the Supreme Court has long held that 
 
 10. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  
 11. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967); see also Agnello v. United States, 
269 U.S. 20, 33 (1925). Such a presumption of unreasonableness can be rebutted given that a 
recognized exception applies. See, e.g., Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) (holding 
that warrantless automobile searches are constitutionally permissible because of their inherent 
mobility). 
 The justifications for the presumption against the constitutionality of warrantless searches 
are primarily two-fold. First, the Court wanted to avoid post hoc evaluations of whether 
probable cause existed prior to a search out of the fear that such determinations would be 
colored by the evidence obtained during the search. Katz, 389 U.S. at 358 (citation omitted). 
Second, judges provide a more neutral assessment of the evidence supporting probable cause 
than law enforcement, who have a vested interest in carrying out the search. Id.; see also United 
States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951).  
 Moreover, the presumption of unreasonableness for warrantless searches may also justify 
the Court‘s focus on the word ―search‖ in the Fourth Amendment, as opposed to whether a 
search is ―unreasonable.‖ Justice Scalia has indicated that by focusing on whether police 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol39/iss1/11
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in instances where the government executes searches in violation of 
the Fourth Amendment, the evidence obtained from such a search 
may not be used as direct evidence of guilt at trial.
12
 
A. What Is a Fourth Amendment Search, and How Should It Be 
Analyzed? 
With its decision in Katz v. United States,
13
 the Supreme Court 
articulated the primary test for Fourth Amendment search 
jurisprudence. Katz held that the warrantless wiretap of a 
conversation held inside a public telephone booth was 
unconstitutional,
14
 famously reasoning that the Constitution ―protects 
people, not places.‖15 However, it was Justice John Harlan‘s 
concurrence that provided one of the definitive tests for determining 
when Fourth Amendment protection exists: ―[T]here is a twofold 
requirement, first that a person have exhibited [a subjective] 
expectation of privacy, and second, that the expectation be one that 
society is prepared to recognize as ‗reasonable.‘‖16 
That being said, Katz implicitly recognized two different 
conceptions of privacy rights: considering privacy as both an 
individual right and as a condition to be obtained.
17
 On the condition 
 
activity constitutes a ―search,‖ the Court can better allow for warrantless police activity that 
would intuitively qualify as ―searching‖ but still preserves the general rule that warrantless 
searches are unconstitutional. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 32 (2001). 
 12. E.g., United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 624–25 (1980); Weeks v. United States, 
232 U.S. 383, 394 (1914). Interestingly, government violations of the Fourth Amendment have 
not always excluded the evidence obtained. Until 1914, courts were not required to exclude 
evidence that ran afoul of the Fourth Amendment‘s protection against ―unreasonable searches 
and seizures.‖ See Weeks, 232 U.S. at 390. Instead, civil liability provided the primary deterrent 
for law enforcement to avoid warrantless searches. See United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 
996 (7th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted) (stating that the framers were more concerned that 
warrants would protect law enforcement from tort suits, as opposed to championing warrants as 
protections against law enforcement abuse).  
 13. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).  
 14. Id. at 359.  
 15. Id. at 351. The Court previously ruled that such wiretapping was constitutional since 
the phone booth and wires were publically accessible. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 
(1928).  
 16. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 17. This distinction is illustrated in the following example:  
One way to clarify this distinction is to think of a case in which the term ―privacy‖ is 
used in a [conditional] way: ―When I was getting dressed at the doctor‘s office the 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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side, the Court repeatedly highlighted that the Defendant did not 
expose his conversation to the public; thus his conversation should be 
entitled to Fourth Amendment protection.
18
 The Court also played up 
the rights-based understanding of privacy and emphasized the ―vital 
role that the public telephone has come to play in private 
communication,‖  communication that is separate and apart from 
public exposure.
19
 When considering Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence, it is useful to break the Court‘s prior decisions and 
analysis into these two different camps as opposed to using the 
murky ―expectation of privacy‖ test. 
B. Defining the Condition of Privacy 
Giving information to a third party enables law enforcement to 
obtain that information through the third party without conducting a 
search.
20
 In United States v. Miller,
21
 the Court held that the voluntary 
 
other day, I was in a room with nice thick walls and a heavy door—I had some 
measure of privacy.‖ Here it seems that the meaning is [conditional]—the person is 
reporting [her actual state of privacy]. Had someone breached this zone, the person 
might have said, ―You should not be here. Please respect my privacy!‖ In this latter 
case, [a right to privacy] would be stressed. 
ADAM D. MOORE, PRIVACY RIGHTS: MORAL AND LEGAL FOUNDATIONS 14 (2010). It should be 
noted that in his original example, Moore is actually discussing two different, but related, 
subjects. In his first example, he makes the distinction between the normative and non-
normative categories of privacy. Id. at 14–15. However, his example is equally illuminating for 
the rights versus condition contrast. 
 18. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351. 
 19. Id. at 352.  
 20. In response to the judicial decisions below, Congress enacted legislation limiting the 
authority of law enforcement officers to access phone number information without a warrant. 
For example, under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 
§ 2709, 100 Stat. 1848, 1867 (1986), Congress required that law enforcement show a court that 
relevant information is likely to be uncovered. JON L. MILLS, PRIVACY: THE LOST RIGHT 49 
(2008) (citing Christopher Slobogin, Transaction Surveillance by the Government, 75 MISS. 
L.J. 139 (2005)). Following Miller v. United States, Congress provided even more stringent 
protection for bank records. Under the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-
630, §§ 1102(5), 1104–06, 92 Stat. 3641, 3697–3700 (1978), Congress required that law 
enforcement write a ―formal written request‖ or obtain one of the following: ―voluntary 
authorization by the customer; administrative summons; search [warrant]; [or] judicial 
subpoena.‖ Id. (citing George B. Trubow & Dennis L. Hudson, The Right to Financial Privacy 
Act of 1978: New Protection from Federal Intrusion, 12 J. MARSHALL J. PRAC. & PROC. 487, 
494 (1979)). 
 21. 425 U.S. 435 (1976).  
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conveyance of financial information to a bank enabled the 
government to access that information without a warrant,
22
 because 
those giving it up ―tak[e] the risk . . . that the information will be 
conveyed by that [third] person to the Government.‖23 Similarly, the 
Court has held that the warrantless installation of a device to record 
phone numbers dialed from a specific phone and the warrantless 
recording of conversations by a police informant were constitutional 
because the defendants in both cases voluntarily conveyed the 
information at issue to another party.
24
 
In addition to the voluntary conveyance of information, the Court 
considers access important as well: the public exposure of 
information weighs against the classification of police activity as a 
search. For example, the Supreme Court held in California v. 
Ciraolo
25
 that aerial surveillance of property is not a search because 
―[a]ny member of the public flying in this airspace who glanced 
down could have seen everything that these officers observed.‖26 
 
 22. Id. at 443. 
 23. Id.  
 24. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 
745, 749, 752 (1971) (citing Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966); Lewis v. United 
States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966)).  
 Notably, Justice Stewart proffered two arguments in his Smith dissent that are applicable to 
GPS surveillance. First, he reasoned that the numbers themselves are ―an integral part of the 
telephonic communication‖ that ―easily could reveal the identities of the persons and the places 
called . . . [revealing] the most intimate details of a person‘s life.‖ Smith, 442 U.S. at 747–48 
(Stewart, J., dissenting). Second, he observed: ―I doubt there are any who would be happy to 
have broadcast to the world a list of the local or long distance numbers they have called.‖ Id. at 
748. 
 In cases where conversations were recorded by an undercover operative, the Court took the 
position that even though the defendant may subjectively believe that the information he 
divulges in a conversation will not fall into government hands, that belief is irrelevant; the 
surrender of the information to a third party was the constitutionally dispositive factor. White, 
401 U.S. at 749 (quoting Hoffa, 395 U.S. at 302). 
 25. 476 U.S. 207 (1986).  
 26. Id. at 213–14; see also Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986). As the 
D.C. Circuit later contended, however, it could be argued that the Ciraolo decision is limited in 
applicability. United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 559 (2010), rev’d sub nom. United 
States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). Indeed, the Ciraolo Court emphasized the routine nature 
of air travel: ―[W]here private and commercial flight in the public airways is routine, it is 
unreasonable for respondent to expect [constitutional protection].‖ Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 215 
(emphasis added). However, earlier in Ciraolo, the Court disposed of the primary issue without 
addressing the frequency of public flight, indicating that consideration of the frequency of flight 
is analytically relevant, but not fundamental. Id. at 214–15. Finding a strong frequency 
limitation in Ciraolo is suspect for another reason as well. In California v. Greenwood, 486 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Moreover, the Court decreed in California v. Greenwood
27
 that one 
does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in garbage placed 
street-side for pickup because of the possibility that the public would 
become privy to its contents.
28
 More recently, however, in Bond v. 
United States
29
 the Court held that even though carry-on baggage in 
an overhead compartment was exposed to movement and control by 
the public (i.e. the other passengers), the squeezing baggage 
inspection of a police officer constituted a search.
30
 
Related to a condition-based inquiry is the sensory augmentation 
doctrine. Essentially, if law enforcement uses technology that is 
sufficiently similar to the natural capabilities of a police officer 
without such technology, the investigation is constitutional. For 
example, in Texas v. Brown,
31
 the Court held that the use of a 
flashlight to illuminate the interior of a car did not violate the Fourth 
Amendment, likening its use to using binoculars, which merely 
enhances eyesight.
32
 This doctrine is discussed at greater length infra 
Part II.E.
33
 
C. Defining Privacy as a Matter of Right 
Since Katz, the Court has specifically recognized certain instances 
where the right to privacy exists, regardless of whether the condition 
of privacy can actually be obtained. Most notably, the Court has 
vigorously restricted government access to information about 
activities occurring inside the home. In Kyllo v. United States,
34
 the 
 
U.S. 35 (1988), the Court emphasized that a possibility of observation is the dispositive factor, 
not the probability that something will actually be observed. See id. at 41 (stating that Ciraolo 
turned on the possibility that anyone flying over could have seen what law enforcement 
observed, not the popularity of flight). 
 27. 486 U.S. 35 (1988).  
 28. Id. at 40–41. The Court also found it significant that the garbage would be surrendered 
to a third party (the garbage man) who could have sorted through the refuse or allowed the 
police to access it. Id.  
 29. 529 U.S. 334 (2000).  
 30. Id. at 338–39. In so holding, the Court specifically considered the intrusive nature of 
physical inspection and the decision of the passengers to keep carry-on luggage nearby. Id. at 
337–38.  
 31. 460 U.S. 730 (1983).  
 32. Id. at 739–40 (quoting United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559, 563 (1927)). 
 33. See infra text accompanying notes 53–55. 
 34. 533 U.S. 27 (2001).  
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Court ruled that the use of equipment to detect heat emitted from the 
home was a search,
35
 reasoning that as a ―constitutionally protected 
area,‖36 ―all details [about the interior of the home] are intimate 
details.‖37 In United States v. Karo,38 the Court similarly ruled that 
the government could not track the location of objects within a home 
without a warrant.
39
 
Privacy rights can limit public surveillance based on the type or 
intimate nature of information revealed as well. In Dow Chemical Co. 
v. United States,
40
 the Court recognized that the constitutional 
analysis could vary depending upon the level of detail depicted in 
aerial photographs.
41
 More importantly, Katz emphasized the ―vital 
role that the public telephone has come to play in private 
communication‖ when holding that phone tapping constituted a 
search.
42
 
D. Multi-Factor Analysis 
The Court took yet another approach in Oliver v. United States,
43
 
looking to a combination of factors bearing on both  condition and 
rights-based conceptions of privacy to affirm that an investigation 
upon wide swaths of land outside the immediate area of a home was 
not a search.
44
 The Court considered not only the general inability of 
field owners to exclude others and the ease with which the public can 
access the fields but also the lack of ―intimate activity‖ that occurs in 
the area.
45
 Further, the Court noted the lack of policy justifications for 
 
 35. Id. at 41.  
 36. Id. at 34 (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961)).  
 37. Id. at 37.  
 38. 468 U.S. 705 (1984).  
 39. Id. at 714-16.  
 40. 476 U.S. 227 (1986).  
 41. Id. at 238-39. 
 42. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967).  
 43. 466 U.S. 170 (1984).  
 44. Id. at 178-79. Note the relationship between tortious activity and constitutional 
protections lurking underneath the Oliver rationale. Implicit within the Court‘s holding is that 
trespass on behalf of the government does not necessarily qualify as a search.  
 45. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 179. 
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protection under the Fourth Amendment and the ease with which the 
same information could be obtained through flyovers.
46
 
E. The Humble Beginnings of Vehicle Tracking: Beepers 
While the decisions above give a taste of pertinent Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence, most do not directly address the issues 
presented by tracking technology. The Supreme Court first to 
analyzed the use of tracking technology by law enforcement nearly 
thirty years ago in United States v. Knotts.
47
 Knotts involved ―beeper‖ 
technology, which does not pinpoint or record location data, unlike 
the conventional understanding of tracking technology today. Instead, 
beepers emit radio signals in a periodic fashion, requiring that a 
receiver be within a certain distance in order to register the signal and 
track the device's location.
48
 In Knotts, law enforcement officers used 
a beeper to obtain evidence that led to a search warrant, which 
culminated in Defendant Knotts‘ conviction.49 On appeal, the Court 
ruled that the warrantless use of such tracking devices was 
constitutional.
50
  
The Court arrived at its conclusion in part because it found visual 
surveillance to be indistinguishable from beeper use. By emphasizing 
law enforcement‘s limited use of the beeper, the Court reasoned that 
 
 46. Id. 
 47. 460 U.S. 276 (1983).  
 48. See id. at 277.  
 49. Id. at 279. The facts underlying Knotts are standard fare for tracking decisions. One 
defendant, Armstrong, bought chemicals that could be used for manufacturing drugs and 
delivered them to a co-defendant, Petschen. Id. at 278. Without a warrant, law enforcement 
officers placed a beeper inside one of the containers of chemicals being bought by Armstrong, 
which was subsequently placed in Petschen‘s vehicle. Id. at 277–78. The beeper was installed 
with consent of the retailer. Id. at 278. While following Petschen, the officers cut off their 
visual surveillance of Petschen in reaction to his evasive maneuvers; law enforcement officers 
lost the beeper‘s signal as well. Id. at 278. After approximately one hour, law enforcement 
regained contact with the beeper, eventually using it to identify Knotts‘ cabin as the ultimate 
destination. Id. at 278. The police then relied on the beeper to locate the destination of Petschen 
and the chemicals—a cabin occupied by the third codefendant, Knotts. Id. at 278.  
 The record did not reflect that the beeper had been used after location of the cabin, so the 
Court was not presented with concerns over tracking items contained within the home, id. at 
278–79, which would give rise to other constitutional implications. See United States v. Karo, 
468 U.S. 705 (1984) (holding that using a beeper to detect its location within a home is 
unconstitutional). 
 50. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 285. 
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the information obtained through the beeper could easily have been 
revealed through visual surveillance.
51
 Therefore, warrantless beeper 
tracking was constitutional because ―a person traveling . . . on public 
thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his 
movements from one place to another.‖52  
The Court further buttressed this conclusion, holding that if the 
technology at issue is ―augmenting the sensory faculties bestowed 
upon [law enforcement officers] at birth,‖ then it is constitutional.53 
Under this rule, the Court analogized the beeper‘s improvement on 
tracking technology—the ability to track location without line-of-
sight contact—to the magnification provided by telescopes and the 
illumination provided by searchlights, which are undoubtedly 
constitutional.
54
 The Court declared, ―We have never equated police 
efficiency with unconstitutionality, and we decline to do so now.‖55 
It is also noteworthy that Knotts alleged that beepers would allow 
continuous surveillance of ―any citizen‖ without any judiciary 
oversight
56—an argument that was somewhat ahead of its time, as it 
resonates with great force in the area of GPS tracking.
57
 However, the 
 
 51. Id. at 281–82. 
 52. Id. at 281. But see Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 35 n.2 (2001) (reasoning that 
―[t]he fact that equivalent information could sometimes be obtained by other means does not 
make lawful the use of means that violate the Fourth Amendment.‖). This Kyllo quote could be 
read as disposing of the sensory augmentation analysis once and for all. However, Kyllo simply 
set an upper limitation on the sensory augmentation doctrine, stating that it was not dispositive 
over every other consideration, such as the character of the information revealed. 
 Additionally, following Knotts, Congress enacted a statute addressing ―mobile tracking 
devices.‖ 18 U.S.C.S. § 3117 (LexisNexis 2010). Oddly enough, as the D.C. Circuit indicated 
in United States v. Gbemisola, 225 F.3d 753 (2000), unlike the statute barring the use of 
evidence obtained from an unauthorized wiretap, § 3117 does not bar the use of evidence 
obtained without authorization, despite specifying that such authorization may be provided. Id. 
at 758 (citing 18 U.S.C.S. §§ 2515, 3117 (LexisNexis 2010)). Therefore, the statute does not 
seem to have a substantial effect on tracking device usage in law enforcement, since sanctions 
do not follow from unauthorized tracking. 
 53. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 282–83. The Court also analogized the use of beepers to the phone 
number recording device in Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979), reasoning that since the 
device did not change the constitutional inquiry, neither should the beeper. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 
283. The court also cited Smith for the related proposition that simply because machines 
perform tasks that used to be required of humans, the constitutional analysis does not change. 
Id. 
 54. See Knotts, 460 U.S. at 282–83. 
 55. Id. at 284. 
 56. Id. at 283 (quoting Brief for Respondent at 9, Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (No. 81-1802)).  
 57. See infra text accompanying notes 121–22, 141–42. 
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Court dismissed this concern based on the contemporary law 
enforcement use of beepers, stating that ―the reality hardly suggests 
abuse.‖58 The Court did not disregard Knotts‘ concerns entirely, 
though, and explicitly reserved judgment on ―dragnet-type law 
enforcement practices‖ such as ―twenty-four hour surveillance of any 
citizen of this country‖ because it recognized that unique 
constitutional concerns could arise in such situations.
59
  
F. The Latest and Greatest: GPS Tracking Technology  
The advent of cheap GPS technology changes the tracking game 
significantly. Information can be obtained from GPS devices 
independent of any contemporaneous law enforcement action 
because GPS tracking devices can record location information over 
the long-term.
60
 This stands in stark contrast to beepers, which 
require law enforcement to actively be within range of the beeper in 
order to track the signals emitted.
61
 
In United States v. Garcia,
62
 the Seventh Circuit erected one pole 
of the debate, holding that the use of GPS tracking devices does not 
require a warrant.
63
 To begin, the court cited Knotts, stating that 
tracking movements on a public street does not constitute a search 
under the Fourth Amendment.
64
 It continued by analogizing GPS 
surveillance to video surveillance of public places or satellite 
imaging, stating that the ―only difference is that in the imaging case 
nothing touches the vehicle . . . . But it is a distinction without any 
 
 58. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 283 (quoting Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 566 
(1978)). 
 59. Id. at 284 (quoting in second quotation Brief for Respondent at 9, United States v. 
Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983) (No. 81-1802)). In fact, the most debated portion of Knotts 
concerns the potential abuse of warrantless beeper tracking. See infra note 71. 
 60. See United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 995 (7th Cir. 2007) (describing police use 
of a ―memory tracking device‖ to determine a vehicle‘s travel history). That said, GPS devices 
can, of course, emit live-action tracking of one‘s location as well. Victoria GPS Tracking 
System, LAND AIR SEA, http://www.landairsea.com/gps-tracking-systems/gps-tracking-victoria 
.html (last visited Mar. 5, 2012). 
 61. See Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281.  
 62. 474 F.3d 994 (7th Cir. 2007).  
 63. See id. at 997-98. Other circuits held similarly prior to United States v. Jones. See, 
e.g., United States v. Marquez, 605 F.3d 604, 610 (8th Cir. 2010); United States v. Pineda-
Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir. 2010), vacated and remanded, 132 S. Ct. 1533 (2012).  
 64. Garcia, 474 F.3d at 996. 
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practical difference.‖65 Expounding further, the court held that GPS 
technology, like beepers, is merely a substitute for following a car on 
a public street, which ―is unequivocally not a search.‖66 Despite 
having disposed of individual warrantless tracking as constitutional, 
the court reserved the question of mass GPS surveillance by 
emphasizing that law enforcement currently uses GPS tracking only 
upon suspects, not random citizens.
67
  
The D.C. Circuit in United States v. Maynard
68
 (the appellate 
decision preceding United States v. Jones
69
), on the other hand, held 
that extended warrantless GPS surveillance is a search and is 
unconstitutional by extension.
70
 After distinguishing Knotts,
71
 the 
 
 65. Id. at 997. 
 66. Id. at 997. The court reasoned that this ―substitution‖ makes GPS tracking 
distinguishable from Kyllo, see supra text accompanying notes 34–39, because the technology 
in Kyllo is a substitute for a kind of search that is governed by the Fourth Amendment. Garcia, 
474 F.3d at 997. 
 67. Id. at 998. The scope of Garcia‘s holding is somewhat ambiguous. On one hand, the 
tone throughout the opinion is quite cut-and-dry in favor of constitutionality. For example the 
Seventh Circuit stated that the ―only difference [between satellite imaging and GPS tracking] is 
that in the imaging case nothing touches the vehicle. . . . A distinction without any practical 
difference.‖ Id. at 997. On the other hand, there is somewhat more hesitant language at the end 
of the opinion: ―[Law enforcement] do GPS tracking only when they have a suspect in their 
sights. [Law enforcement in this case] had, of course, abundant grounds for suspecting the 
defendant.‖ Id. at 998.  
 Some have interpreted this language to mean that the Seventh Circuit only intended to hold 
that GPS tracking was constitutional upon reasonable suspicion. See, e.g., United States v. 
Marquez, 605 F.3d 604, 610 (8th Cir. 2010). While the reasonable suspicion standard is a 
satisfactory solution given the issues surrounding GPS tracking, see infra text accompanying 
notes 153–61, the context in which the Seventh Circuit‘s statements were made undermines this 
interpretation. Their statements regarding suspicion come amid repeated references to ―mass 
surveillance,‖ Garcia, 474 F.3d at 998, and thus were meant to ease concerns about such a turn 
of events.  
 68. 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010), rev'd sub nom. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 
(2012).  
 69. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949.  
 70. Id. at 568. 
 71. To distinguish itself from Knotts, the court reasoned that the Supreme Court explicitly 
reserved the issue of extended vehicle tracking. By stating that the Court would address 
―dragnet-type law enforcement‖ when the issue arose, see supra text accompanying note 59, the 
D.C. Circuit argued that the Court was responding directly to Knotts‘ allegation that warrantless 
beeper tracking would allow limitless intrusion upon the affairs of individual citizens, and 
therefore the Court did not simply reserve the concern of mass surveillance. Maynard, 615 F.3d 
at 556–67.  
 This interpretation is not universally accepted. For example, the government in Maynard 
argued that the ―dragnet-type‖ surveillance referred to in Knotts was meant to address mass 
surveillance and did not concern use upon an individual suspect. Maynard, 615 F.3d at 556; see 
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court in Maynard analyzed the degree to which movements are 
exposed to the public (and thus not entitled to Fourth Amendment 
protection). First, the court considered the probability that a single 
individual would actually witness every movement of a person over 
an extended period of time.
72
 Holding that this consideration is only 
defined by ―what a reasonable person expects another might actually 
do,‖ the court concluded that the chance that a single person would 
see the entirety of one's movements over an extended period of time 
is almost nil.
73
 Therefore, an individual‘s movements over a period of 
time are not exposed to the public.
74
  
Second, the court addressed whether the exposure of individual 
journeys to the public constituted exposure of all journeys in 
combination.
75
 Once again, the court reasoned that because 
 
also Tarik N. Jallad, Old Answers to New Questions: GPS Surveillance and the Unwarranted 
Need for Warrants, 11 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 351, 371–72 (2010).  
 The decision in Garcia could be read as endorsing this second viewpoint, because the 
Seventh Circuit primarily justified its ruling in terms of analogy to other, constitutional means 
of surveillance, as opposed to starting its analysis anew. See supra text accompanying notes 62–
67. However, the D.C. Circuit in Maynard reasoned that the Defendant in Garcia explicitly 
conceded that his movements would be covered by Knotts and thus the Seventh Circuit did not 
have the occasion to reconsider Knotts. Maynard, 615 F.3d at 557 (quoting Brief for Petitioner 
at 22, United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994 (2007) (No. 06-2741)).  
 The interpretation of the Government in Maynard seems dubious, given the conventional 
definitions for ―dragnet.‖ As defined in the American Heritage Dictionary, a ―dragnet‖ is ―a 
system of coordinated procedures to catch wanted persons such as criminals.‖ THE AMERICAN 
HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 426 (4th ed. 2004). In the Webster‘s International Dictionary, 
dragnet is defined as ―a network of measures for apprehension (as of criminals).‖ WEBSTER‘S 
THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 684 (3d ed. 1993). Most importantly though, the 
majority of the Court in Jones indicated that the proper interpretation of the ―dragnet‖ phrase in 
Knotts was meant to encompass the surveillance of individuals. See United States v. Jones, 132 
S. Ct. 945, 952 n.6 (2012) (referring to "dragnet" surveillance as the type made possible in the 
Jones case). 
 72. Maynard, 615 F.3d at 558–59.  
 73. Id. at 559-60 (citing Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334 (2000); Florida v. Riley, 488 
U.S. 445 (1989); California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 
207 (1986); United States v. Gbemisola, 225 F.3d 753 (D.C. Cir. 2000)). 
 74. Maynard, 615 F.3d at 560. 
 75. Id. at 558, 560. The D.C. Circuit‘s precedential support for this facet of its analysis is 
rather weak. Although it does cite a case in which the Supreme Court held that a collection of 
related information reveals different information than the individual parts, Dep‘t of Justice v. 
Nat‘l Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. 749 (1989) (holding that while a person‘s individual crimes 
were part of the public record, a person‘s ―rap sheet‖ listing all such offenses was not), the D.C. 
Circuit contended that Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979), recognized this proposition in 
the Fourth Amendment context. Maynard, 615 F.3d at 561. This argument is unfounded. In 
Smith, all phone numbers dialed were exposed to a single party—the phone company. Smith, 
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individuals do not expect anyone to record all their movements over 
an extended time, such movements are not inherently public.
76
 
Moreover, in reaching its conclusion, the court emphasized that ―no 
single journey reveals the habits and patterns that mark the distinction 
between a day in the life and a way of life, nor the departure from a 
routine that . . . may reveal even more.‖77  
Third, the court addressed the analogy of GPS tracking to visual 
surveillance, reasoning that underpinned both Garcia and Knotts.
78
 
After reasoning that prolonged visual surveillance is generally 
beyond the capabilities of law enforcement,
79
 the court ultimately 
declined to address the constitutionality of long-term visual 
surveillance.
80
 The court reasoned that the precise issue was not in 
front of the court because GPS presents a different means of attaining 
location data than does visual tracking.
81
  
Finally, the court directly addressed the Defendant‘s reasonable 
expectation of privacy from a rights-based perspective, aside from the 
condition of being exposed to the public.
82
 Initially, the court noted 
that the personal information revealed through such long-term 
surveillance reveals more intimate information than in other Supreme 
Court cases where Fourth Amendment protection was afforded based 
on the intimate nature of information alone.
83
 Ultimately, however, 
after considering state legislation and other court decisions, the court 
concluded that individuals possessed expectation of privacy in their 
movements in the long-term.
84
 
 
442 U.S. at 743–45. Therefore, the Court was not presented with a fact pattern to make such a 
sum versus parts distinction.  
 76. Maynard, 615 F.3d at 563. 
 77. Id. at 562. The court continued to offer especially powerful illustrations of this 
principle: ―[A] single trip to a gynecologist‘s office tells little about a woman, but that trip 
followed a few weeks later by a visit to a baby supply store tells a different story.‖ Id. at 562. 
 78. Id. at 565.  
 79. Id.  
 80. Id. at 566. 
 81. Id.  
 82. Id. at 563.  
 83. Id. 563–64 (citing Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001); Bond v. United States, 
529 U.S. 334 (2000); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs‘ Ass‘n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989); Katz v. United 
States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)).  
 84. Maynard, 615 F.3d at 564–65.  
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Justice Alito‘s concurrence in United States v. Jones following the 
appeal of Maynard was somewhat narrower in scope than the D.C. 
Circuit's holding. After heavily criticizing the majority, Justice Alito 
reasoned that four weeks of continuous monitoring certainly 
exceeded what society was prepared to recognize as private.
85
 
However, he added a wrinkle to the Fourth Amendment analysis, 
channeling the sensory augmentation doctrine to account for the 
offense being investigated: 
We . . . need not consider whether prolonged GPS monitoring 
in the context of investigations involving extraordinary 
offenses would similarly intrude on a constitutionally protected 
sphere of privacy. In such cases, long-term tracking might 
have been mounted using previously available techniques.
86
   
Justice Sotomayor, while agreeing with the majority opinion, 
presented another relevant issue: the chilling effect of tracking. She 
contended: ―Awareness that the Government may be watching chills 
associational and expressive freedoms. . . . GPS monitoring . . . may 
alter the relationship between citizen and government in a way that is 
inimical to democratic society.‖87 
III. ANALYSIS 
As is evidenced above, courts have not agreed on a single-tack 
approach to Fourth Amendment analysis. In fact, in Oliver v. United 
States,
88
 the Court endorsed a multi-factor consideration to these 
issues: ―No single factor determines whether an individual 
legitimately may claim under the Fourth Amendment that a place 
should be free of government intrusion not authorized by warrant.‖89 
This Note follows the Court‘s lead in Oliver and covers many 
applicable Fourth Amendment doctrines in an effort to pinpoint the 
 
 85. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 964 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 86. Id. (emphasis added). 
 87. Id. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  
 88. 466 U.S. 170 (1984). 
 89. Id. at 177. Also recall that the Court considered a number of factors to reach its 
holding. See supra Part II.D. 
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most pertinent considerations surrounding GPS surveillance. Many 
issues must be considered: the likelihood a single civilian could 
become privy to the same information GPS gathers, a driver‘s control 
over the information about her vehicle‘s location, whether GPS can 
be characterized as mere enhancement of efficiency or sensory 
augmentation, the intimate nature of information divulged, and 
government need for GPS tracking as weighed against the social 
consequences of GPS tracking.  
A. The Condition-Related Inquiries 
1. Likelihood a Single Civilian Could Obtain Similar Location 
Information Unaided by Tracking Devices 
Maynard‘s assessment that a third party would be unlikely to 
uncover the information recorded by GPS tracking devices is correct. 
The validity of Maynard‘s reasoning becomes readily apparent once 
the holding is tweaked to reflect a less stringent test that is more 
consistent with the ―public exposure‖ logic in Knotts: the ease that 
one can lose a condition of privacy,
90
 as opposed to whether others 
will likely cause that condition to be lost.
91
 To illustrate this point, 
 
 90. See supra note 17 for a discussion of the condition of privacy as contrasted to privacy 
as a right.  
 91. This distinction is not mere semantics. It is true that Maynard and a more recent 
Supreme Court decision couch their rules in terms of the probability that others will behave in a 
certain fashion. See Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 338–39 (2000) (regarding physical 
inspection of carry-on luggage); Maynard, 615 F.3d at 559–60. However, if Knotts is still to be 
considered good Fourth Amendment law for tracking cases, then the standard must center upon 
the ease of accessing the same information. The facts in Knotts quickly illustrate the necessity 
to make this distinction.  
 In Knotts, law enforcement followed Petschen for over one hundred miles, across state 
lines, likely changing highways multiple times, and ultimately ending up at a remote cabin 
outside a town of under 1,500 people. See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 278 (1983); 
Driving Directions from St. Paul, MN to Shell Lake, WI, GOOGLE MAPS, http://maps 
.google.com (last visited Mar. 5, 2012) (enter search term ―St. Paul, MN to Shell Lake, WI‖); 
SHELL LAKE, WISCONSIN, http://www.shelllakewi.com (last visited Mar. 5, 2012). Surely, no 
one should reasonably expect that a single person would see the entirety of a single trip like 
this. This is especially true considering the route taken in St. Paul, Minnesota to access the 
highway and the route taken off of the highway after nearing Knotts‘ cabin. (In fact, the 
likelihood of anyone seeing the entirety of a shorter trip seems quite unlikely as well.)  
 Based upon Petschen‘s remote destination and somewhat complicated route, it seems that 
the risk of anyone physically following someone like the suspect in Knotts is incredibly small. 
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consider the ease of obtaining all of the location information 
uncovered by GPS.
92
  
Even under the easier test, Maynard is correct: the likelihood that 
an individual could have all of her long-term movements actually 
uncovered without police involvement is incredibly small. Even 
ignoring the high possibility of being discovered, gathering the same 
information as a long-term GPS tracker would require continuous 
visual surveillance for weeks at a time. Such a dedicated effort to 
observe another is beyond the capabilities of nearly all civilians and 
indicates that GPS surveillance is a search. Thus, it naturally follows 
that because long-term surveillance is inherently difficult, the risk of 
someone successfully conducting such visual surveillance—the 
Maynard standard—is incredibly small.93  
2. Control of Location Information 
The notion of personal control over information is crucial to 
Fourth Amendment analysis.
94
 The cases that discuss control break 
the concept into two rough categories: cases where control of 
 
Therefore, the logical foundation of the Knotts decision lies with the ease by which information 
can be uncovered, rather than the risk that someone will actually do so. See also supra note 26.  
 92. Both Sherry Colb and Ric Simmons show that the risk of losing information and the 
ease that such information can be obtained are different yet logically related concepts. Sherry 
Colb argues that in Knotts, Greenwood, and Oliver, ―[T]he Court made the logical leap from the 
fact that it is ‗easy‘ to victimize (and therefore risky to be in that person‘s shoes) to the 
conclusion‖ that the police can access the same information. Sherry F. Colb, What is a Search? 
Two Conceptual Flaws in Fourth Amendment Doctrine and Some Hints of a Remedy, 55 STAN. 
L. REV. 119, 136–37 (2002). Simmons implicitly recognized this distinction while discussing 
the Ciraolo decision, reasoning that the Court ―conflates what modern technology has made 
possible (which by itself does not change what society views as public or private) with how 
modern technology has changed society‖ by equating flyovers with aerial examinations. Ric 
Simmons, From Katz to Kyllo: A Blueprint for Adapting the Fourth Amendment to Twenty-
First Century Technologies, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 1303, 1333 (2002). 
 93. Disturbingly, a variation of extended observation in the United States is a relatively 
common occurrence: stalking. According to the Stalking Victim‘s Center, 3.4 million people 
are stalked each year, with 11 percent of victims having been stalked for over five years, and 10 
percent of victims having been stalked with the assistance of GPS tracking. Stalking Facts, 
STALKING RESOURCE CENTER, http://www.ncvc.org/src/main.aspx?dbID=DB_statistics195 
(last visited Feb. 10, 2012) (citing Katrina Baum et al., Stalking Victimization in the United 
States, United States Dep‘t of Justice: Office of Justice Programs (2009), available at http:// 
www.ncvc.org/SRC/AGP.Net/Components/DocumentViewer/Download.aspxnz?DocumentID=
45862).  
 94. See supra text accompanying notes 20–30. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol39/iss1/11
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2012]  Vehicular GPS Surveillance 355 
 
 
information was directly given to a third party and cases where 
information was not given to others, but was available for the 
taking.
95
  
In the first category, where information was readily conveyed to a 
third party, the relinquishment of control completely nullified any 
expectation of privacy, no matter what information was revealed.
96
 
Those handing over the information ―take[] the risk . . . that the 
information will be conveyed by that [third] person to the 
Government.‖97  
Using external GPS tracking devices is not the same because as a 
general rule, individuals do not turn over logs of their vehicular 
movements to a third party. Even those with a GPS device or a safety 
system such as OnStar do not land in this category. The emphasis 
here is on the word ―voluntary.‖ While it seems that most people 
understand that their movements can be tracked by cell phone 
technology, it does not appear that users of these systems understand 
their movements to actually be recorded unless they explicitly 
authorize third parties to do so.
98
 
Regarding the exposure facet, case law is inconsistent.  In cases 
like Greenwood (the trash bag case), the lack of control over 
information completely determines whether police action is entitled 
to Fourth Amendment protection.
99
 However, in other cases that are 
more analogous to GPS tracking, exposure acts only as a partial 
surrender of Fourth Amendment protection. For example, in Knotts, 
 
 95. See supra text accompanying notes 20–30. The discussion for the exposure element of 
control is very similar to the discussion regarding the likelihood of another obtaining the same 
information as GPS devices. However, the analysis for the former discusses the ability for 
another to obtain information, while the exposure discussion in this part covers the degree to 
which information is given up by a suspect—the two parts look at the dissemination of 
information from two different perspectives.  
 96. See supra text accompanying notes 20–24.  
 97. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976). 
 98. Although most users may not believe their location to be recorded—which is the 
constitutionally relevant consideration for the first category of the control factor—that does not 
mean that it is true. Even basic cell phones record location data for every call. Service providers 
record ―the location of the antenna tower and, where applicable, which of the tower‘s ‗faces‘ 
carried a given call at its beginning and end and, inter alia, the time and date of a call.‖ In re 
Application of the United States for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc‘n Serv. to 
Disclose Records to the Gov‘t, 620 F.3d 304, 308 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 99. See supra notes 27–28 and accompanying text. 
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to reach the conclusion that one does not have any expectation of 
privacy in movements from point to point, the Court noted that 
activities involving cars generally are not thought to rise to the level 
of intimacy that requires Fourth Amendment protection,
100
 in addition 
to reasoning that the driver ―voluntarily conveyed‖ the details of his 
trip ―to anyone who wanted to look.‖101  Then, in Oliver, the Court 
considered the minimally intimate nature that the information 
obtained as well as the public‘s ease of access to open fields.102 
Lastly, and crucially, in Dow Chemical Company,
103
 (an aerial 
photograph companion case to Ciraolo) the Court considered the 
level of detail provided by aerial photographs in addition to the fact 
that they were taken from public airspace.
104
 
Therefore, because vehicular location information is not given 
directly to a third party, the control factor is not dispositive. 
However, GPS surveillance is simply tracking one‘s movements on 
public roads as examined from the perspective of the suspect. 
Whether considering a trip from home to the grocery store, or from 
the gynecologist‘s office to Kids R Us, or the entirety of one‘s 
vehicular movements over the course of a month, the driver‘s 
relinquishment of control—independent of the actions of others—is 
exactly the same. The lack of complete control over information 
surrounding vehicle location indicates that GPS tracking should not 
be considered a search, and the 7th Circuit in Garcia
105
 was on the 
right track.  
3. Sensory Augmentation 
The more readily a technology can be classified as merely 
―augmenting‖ the senses, the less likely the use of a technology will 
 
 100. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983) (quoting Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 
U.S. 583, 590 (1974) (plurality)) (―One has a lesser expectation of privacy in a motor vehicle 
because its function is transportation and it seldom serves as one‘s residence or as the repository 
of personal effects.‖).  
 101. Id. 
 102. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 179 (1984).  
 103. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986).  
 104. Id. at 238–39.  
 105. See supra text accompanying notes 62–67.  
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be classified as a search.
106
 What exactly the court has meant by 
sense augmentation is quite difficult to peg down, however. On the 
one hand, the Court in Knotts declared that ―[w]e have never equated 
police efficiency with unconstitutionality‖ and relied significantly on 
the fact that all of the information gathered through the beeper could 
have been obtained through visual surveillance.
107
 Garcia utilized a 
similar analogy to visual surveillance.
108
 Thus both Knotts and 
Garcia seem to indicate that if the information can theoretically be 
obtained through other means without infringing upon Fourth 
Amendment rights, then the use of the technology does not constitute 
a search. On the other hand, there is the implied standard underlying 
Maynard, which suggests that police would need to be practically 
capable of gathering such information without the sensory 
enhancement technology.
109
  
Justice Alito‘s concurrence in Jones lands somewhere in the 
middle. He asked whether the offense would have garnered the 
attention required of law enforcement to conduct long-term, 
continuous surveillance in the absence of GPS tracking 
capabilities.
110
 While implicitly operating under the presumption that 
similar information could be obtained by non-electronic means,
111
 
Alito restricted the breadth of the sensory augmentation doctrine by 
requiring that law enforcement would actually be willing to invest the 
time and effort required to obtain similar information.
112
  
 
 106. See supra text accompanying notes 31–32, 53–55.  
 107. See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281-85 (1983). 
 108. See United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 997 (7th Cir. 2007).  
 109. The D.C. Circuit in Maynard did not explicitly address the issue of sensory 
augmentation analysis. However, the court compared visual surveillance and GPS tracking, 
alluding that there was no connection between the two because ―practical considerations‖ 
severely limit the effectiveness of visual surveillance in comparison to GPS. United States v. 
Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 565 (D.C. Cir. 2010), rev’d sub nom. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 
945 (2012); see also text accompanying supra notes 78–81. This sort of comparison and 
conclusion follows the augmentation analysis suggested by the Court in Knotts and Brown. See 
text accompanying supra notes 31–32, 53–55. 
 110. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 963–64 (Alito, J., concurring).  
 111. See id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring) (discussing surveillance techniques that could 
have been used before the advent of GPS tracking which could possibly reveal the same 
information as GPS tracking). 
 112. Id. (stating that ―society‘s expectation has been that law enforcement . . . could not. . . 
secretly monitor and catalogue every single movement . . .‖ of a vehicle ―in the main,‖ and that 
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Regardless of which sensory augmentation standard is correct, law 
enforcement is capable of some long-term surveillance, albeit on a 
shorter and less continuous basis than that afforded by GPS.
113
 For 
example, in United States v. Rivera,
114
 DEA agents conducted a 
nineteen-month investigation with repeated physical surveillance of 
several different suspects.
115
 And, in United States v. Williams,
116
 the 
Third Circuit encountered long-term surveillance:  
Physical surveillance conducted between December 1992 and 
April 1993 revealed that an individual took a pouch believed to 
contain numbers slips on a twice-daily basis from a gym 
located on Fifth Avenue to another location and then to the 
Foxcroft Road residence, where he would stay for up to one 
hour.
117
 
As these two cases indicate, GPS surveillance is better characterized 
as increasing the efficiency of law enforcement rather than enabling 
otherwise unavailable information to be gathered. Therefore, at least 
pursuant to the investigation of some offenses,
118
 the augmentation 
factor should weigh against GPS surveillance being classified as a 
search.   
 
long-term surveillance ―might [be] mounted‖ during investigations of extraordinary offenses) 
(emphasis added). 
 113. The D.C. Circuit in Maynard suggests otherwise. Maynard, 615 F.3d at 565 
(―[P]ractical considerations prevent visual surveillance from lasting very long. Continuous 
human surveillance for a week would require all the time and expense of several police officers 
[but] prolonged GPS monitoring is not similarly constrained.‖).  
 114. United States v. Rivera, 527 F.3d 891 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 115. Id. at 901, 903. 
 116. United States v. Williams, 124 F.3d 411 (3d Cir. 1997). 
 117. Id. at 421 (emphasis added).  
 118. As stated above in Part II.F, Justice Alito‘s concurrence in Jones throws a new facet 
into the sensory augmentation consideration by implying that he would consider whether a 
police department would be willing to gather the same kind of information through long-term 
non-GPS surveillance. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring). But see  id. at 954 
(stating ―[t]here is no precedent for the proposition that whether a search has occurred depends 
on the nature of the crime being investigated‖). However, considering which offenses would be 
acceptable for warrantless GPS tracking is beyond the scope of this Note. Therefore, it is 
assumed—to the extent it is a relevant consideration—that the ―extraordinary offense‖ 
threshold has been satisfied.   
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B. The Rights-Based Inquiry: The Intimate Nature of Location 
Information
119
  
GPS tracking from a rights-based perspective focuses on the 
character of the information revealed. Simply put, the information 
gathered from watching a single trip versus a month or even week-
long observation is fundamentally different. Aggregation gives rise to 
inferences that would not be possible from examining random, 
shorter trips. In Maynard, for example, the D.C. Circuit noted that 
prolonged surveillance is different from short-term surveillance 
because it reveals ―what a person does repeatedly, what he does not 
do, and what he does ensemble.‖120 University of Maryland Law 
Professor Renee McDonald Hutchins also recognizes this concern. 
She reasons that the ―question of constitutional protection turns on 
the quantity of information revealed‖ because the ―collection of 
 
 119. While Part III.B primarily addresses the character of the information obtained through 
using GPS surveillance, there is another Fourth Amendment privacy right that could be 
implicated: privacy rights based upon location. As implied in Kyllo, the home is a 
―constitutionally protected area‖; thus, any warrantless surveillance of activities of the home 
would constitute a Fourth Amendment search. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) 
(quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961)). The constitutional protection given 
to the home extends to immediately surrounding areas, Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 
178 (1984), possibly even including driveways, see United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 
1212, 1215 (9th Cir. 2010), vacated and remanded, 132 S. Ct. 1533 (2012). Therefore, it would 
seem that monitoring a vehicle‘s location while in an attached garage, much like the beeper in 
Karo, would violate the Fourth Amendment by providing information about the garage 
contents. See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 719 (1984).  
 Even though warrantless GPS monitoring in such places would technically violate the 
Fourth Amendment, it is a violation without consequence. Intuitively speaking, it would seem 
that the primary benefit of GPS surveillance is to determine location, not to determine where an 
object remains. Therefore, because the illegally obtained evidence is generally only barred from 
being introduced as evidence of guilt, United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 624–28 (1980), 
and the government is unlikely to want use the evidence in question anyway, it is unlikely that 
these violations will have a large impact upon case proceedings. However, the ―fruit of the 
poisonous tree‖ doctrine could possibly lead to significant exclusions if the information about 
an item remaining within the protected area has a close connection with (and is a but-for cause 
of) evidence being obtained by the police. Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 592–93 (2006). 
That being said, information from GPS monitoring that is gathered after keeping tabs on a 
vehicle in a constitutionally protected area will not be excluded as a ―fruit of the poisonous 
tree.‖ See Karo, 468 U.S. at 720 (holding that the illegal use of a beeper to locate objects within 
a house does not lead to the exclusion of information gained from monitoring after a beeper 
leaves the house).  
 120. United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 562 (D.C. Cir. 2010),  rev’d sub nom. United 
States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
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seemingly unexceptional data by the government may become 
objectionable by virtue of its sheer volume‖ as it could reveal 
personal information that may otherwise be unavailable.
121
 The part is 
distinct from the whole,
122
 and the intimacy analysis of long-term 
surveillance must center on all vehicular trips collectively.  
That being said, is the sensitive character of this information 
really dispositive? The fact is, similar information is readily available 
to nearly anyone
123
 and a wealth of personal information is already 
available from third party sources.
124
 In fact, a prominent private 
industry has arisen with the purpose of making all kinds of personal 
information readily available, spanning the gamut from height and 
weight information to financial records and leisure activities.
125
  
Furthermore, camera surveillance on a scale that can rival GPS in 
aggregation capabilities is on the rise. For example, an area 
encompassing central London is famously referred to as the ―ring of 
steel‖ since photographs are taken of every vehicle entering and 
 
 121. See Renee McDonald Hutchins, Tied Up in Knotts? GPS Technology and the Fourth 
Amendment, 55 UCLA L. REV. 409, 453–54, 457–58 (2007).  
 122. See also supra notes 75–77 and accompanying text. 
 123. In fact, some have expressed that privacy as a condition can no longer be attained. In 
1999, the CEO of Sun Microsystems rather flippantly declared ―You have zero privacy anyway. 
. . . Get over it.‖ JON L. MILLS, PRIVACY: THE LOST RIGHT 76 (2008) (quoting Sun on Privacy: 
‘Get Over It,’ WIRED (Jan. 26, 1999), http://www.wired.com/politics/law/news/1999/01/ 
17538).  
 124. For example, according to Jon Mills in Privacy: The Lost Right, the credit card system 
has a second purpose aside from giving ready access to credit: selling the information about 
how that credit is used. MILLS, supra note 123, at 61. Moreover, Mills contends that ―bank 
records can provide a ‗virtual current biography‘ of the individual.‖ Id. at 65.  
 125. Laura K. Donohue, Anglo-American Privacy and Surveillance, 96 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 1059, 1142 (2006). The amount of personal information available to both the 
government and third parties through commercial aggregation services is truly staggering:  
[A]ge, income, real property data, children‘s data. . . .[,] education levels, occupation, 
height, weight, political affiliation, ethnicity, race, hobbies[,] net worth. . . .[,] social 
security number, previous addresses . . . neighbors, driver records, current address and 
phone number, current employer . . . license plates/vehicle VIN numbers, unlisted 
numbers, beepers, cell phone numbers, fax numbers, bankruptcy and debtor filings, 
employment records, bank account balances and activity, stock purchases, corporate 
bank account, and credit card activity.  
Id. at 1142 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Donahue also notes that these 
private aggregation companies have connections with the government as well as other private 
industry. Id.  
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exiting
126
 and cameras fill the public areas inside.
127
 New York has 
instituted similar surveillance programs, such as the Lower and 
Midtown Manhattan Security Initiative, which includes around 3,000 
cameras.
128
 
As these examples suggest, our expectation of privacy can and 
does change with the advent of new technologies.
129
 In his article, 
From Katz to Kyllo: A Blueprint for Adapting the Fourth Amendment 
to Twenty-First Century Technologies,
130
 Ric Simmons illustrates this 
concept effectively. Using electric lights as an example, he argues 
that in the eighteenth century, it would have been quite easy to argue 
that activities conducted outdoors, in the dark, would have been 
 
 126. See Marc Jonathan Blitz, Video Surveillance and the Constitution of Public Space: 
Fitting the Fourth Amendment to a World that Tracks Image and Identity, 82 TEX. L. REV. 
1349, 1351 (2004). 
 127. Id.  
 128. Press Release: Midtown Manhattan Security Initiative, NYPD: NEW YORK‘S FINEST 
(Sept. 20, 2010), http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/html/pr/pr_2010_midtown_security_initiative 
.shtml. 
 129. As is evident from the Jones oral arguments, the Supreme Court is currently 
struggling with how much technology has changed expectations of privacy. Justice Alito 
explicitly said, ―I don‘t know what society expects and I think it‘s changing. Technology is 
changing people‘s expectations of privacy.‖ Transcript of Oral Argument at 43, United States v. 
Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012) (No. 10-1259). 
 A 1993 study by Christopher Slobogin and Joseph Schumacher provides quantifiable 
evidence of the changing expectations of society. Among many things, the study measured two 
very comparable police actions: ―[r]ummaging through [a] suitcase at [an] airport‖ and 
―[b]oarding a bus and asking to search luggage.‖ Christopher Slobogin & Joseph E. 
Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy and Autonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases: 
An Empirical Look at ‘Understandings Recognized and Permitted by Society,’ 42 DUKE L.J. 
727, 738–39 (1993). Despite largely being facially analogous—both entail the search of 
luggage by law enforcement while the luggage owners are traveling—those that took the survey 
ranked the relative intrusiveness of each search quite differently. Among fifty hypothetical 
scenarios, the airport search ranked as the twenty-sixth least intrusive, while the bus search 
ranked forty-fourth least intrusive. Id. On a 1–100 scale, 100 being the most intrusive, the 
searches received mean intrusiveness ratings of 60.93 and 77.22, respectively. Id. at 736, 738.  
 A possible explanation for this disparity is expectation. Perhaps individuals did not react as 
strongly to airport searches because it was to be expected based on years of past experience, 
while a luggage search on a bus was not expected and thus elicited a stronger reaction.  
 Declining concern over privacy has more recently been measured in the internet context. 
According to a May 2010 poll, only 33 percent of internet users were concerned about their 
privacy while online, down from 40 percent in 2006. Mary Madden & Aaron Smith, How 
People Monitor Their Identity and Search for Others Online, PEW INTERNET (May 26, 2010), 
http://www.pewinternet.org/Reports/2010/Reputation-Management/Summary-of-Findings.aspx. 
 130. Simmons, supra note 92. 
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considered private.
131
 However, since electric lights are now so 
prevalent, such an argument would certainly fail today.
132
  
The Court has used this logic to highlight the effect that evolving 
expectations have upon search classification. Once again, Simmons 
points out that Ciraolo explicitly relied on the changing expectations 
of society; specifically, that the frequency with which flyovers occur 
does not allow for one to have a reasonable expectation of privacy 
concerning areas visible from above.
133
 In Kyllo, the Court held that 
where ―the Government uses a device that is not in general public 
use, to explore details of the home . . . previously unknowable 
without physical intrusion, the surveillance is a ‗search.‘‖134 More 
recently in Jones, Justice Alito recognized this fact, stating 
―technology can change . . . expectations. Dramatic technological 
change may lead to periods in which popular expectations are in flux 
and may ultimately produce significant changes in popular 
attitudes.‖135 
An examination of contemporary expectations alone weighs 
heavily in favor of GPS tracking not being classified as a search. The 
wide availability of personal information discussed above certainly 
diminishes the intimate character of the inferences that can be drawn 
from GPS data, and consequently indicates that warrantless vehicular 
GPS surveillance should be constitutional.
136
 While it may seem quite 
repugnant to our current perceptions of privacy to allow for such 
surveillance, in reality we already relinquish a great deal of personal 
information. As we become a more integrated, public society, higher 
levels of privacy must be compromised in order to implicate the 
protections of the Fourth Amendment.
137
 
 
 131. Id. at 1332.  
 132. Id.  
 133. Id. at 1332–33. See supra note 26 for a discussion of the ―frequency‖ reasoning in 
Ciraolo. 
 134. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (emphasis added). 
 135. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 962 (2012). 
 136. See supra text accompanying notes 123–28. 
 137. This reasoning does have limits, however. In Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979), 
Justice Harold Blackmun proposed two different hypothetical scenarios that delineate such a 
ceiling. Id. at 740–41 n.5. First, Blackmun imagined that the federal government made an 
announcement that all homes would be subject to warrantless entry over national television. Id. 
Second, he posited a situation where an immigrant came from a nation where she was subject to 
surveillance that would be barred by the Fourth Amendment. Id. In these situations, Blackmun 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol39/iss1/11
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2012]  Vehicular GPS Surveillance 363 
 
 
C. Balancing Governmental and Social Costs 
Having examined the GPS debate from many different legal 
angles, it is now necessary to look at what law enforcement and civil 
society have at stake from a policy perspective. The government‘s 
ability to attach GPS devices to vehicles on a whim would 
considerably increase the tracking capabilities of law enforcement. 
As quoted in Maynard, a former chief of the Los Angeles Police 
Department stated that physical surveillance was extremely 
expensive, and impossible in ―the vast majority of cases.‖138 Using a 
GPS receiver is easily concealed and relatively inexpensive, both in 
terms of manpower and actual expense of a GPS unit.
139
 Accordingly, 
such technology greatly bolsters the surveillance capabilities of law 
enforcement, and would undoubtedly provide a wealth of information 
for obtaining warrants to authorize more intrusive searches.  
These benefits are counterbalanced by several negative 
consequences of GPS tracking; Hutchins insightfully highlights two 
of these concerns. First, as Justice Sotomayor briefly discussed in 
Jones,
140
 if unbridled use of such devices is allowed, then the 
relationship between the government and citizens could be severely 
altered:  
[A]ll individuals will be forced to assume the risk that at any 
moment (and at all moments) the government may be keeping 
a continuous log of their whereabouts . . . . the government will 
be entitled to check whether we spend our lunch hour at the 
gym, at the temple, or at the strip club.
141
  
 
reasoned that the subjective expectations of society or of an individual would not be an 
appropriate measure of Fourth Amendment protection. Id. Instead, he contended that a 
normative inquiry would be required to uphold the Fourth Amendment and the privacy interests 
that inherently accompany it. Id. 
 138. See United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 565 n.* (D.C. Cir. 2010), rev’d sub nom. 
United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).  
 139. See supra notes 2–3 and accompanying text. 
 140. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 956 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 141. Hutchins, supra note 121, at 459.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
364 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 39:337 
 
 
Second, allowing warrantless GPS surveillance would run counter to 
one of the primary purposes behind the Bill of Rights: to maintain 
individual autonomy from government.
142 
 
 Hutchins‘ concerns should certainly be noted, but Steven Penney 
provides a more balanced look to the social costs and benefits of GPS 
tracking technology.
143
 First, law enforcement tracking capabilities 
will take a serious hit based on the Jones decision.
144
 While retrieving 
information about a suspect‘s past movements is possible through 
other means, Penney contends that electronic tracking is far more 
efficient than physical surveillance.
145
 Thus greater privacy protection 
would require law enforcement to gather the same information 
through much more expensive methods before they can obtain a 
warrant for further investigation.
146
 However, Penney weighs these 
advantages against concerns about the chilling effects of completely 
unregulated, warrantless tracking. He asserts that unchecked tracking 
would cause individuals to completely forego activities in which they 
would otherwise participate in order to avoid the scrutiny of law 
enforcement,
147
 would lead to the monitoring of innocent behavior,
148
 
and could be used to harass minority or poverty-ridden 
communities.
149
  
 
 142. See id. at 459 (quoting Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth 
Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 400 (1974)).  
 143. Steven Penney, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy and Novel Search Technologies: 
An Economic Approach, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 477, 519–23 (2007).  
 144. Id. at 519–20. 
 145. See id. 
 146. See id. 
 147. Id. at 521–22. 
 148. Id. at 522. 
 149. Id. at 522–23. Penney‘s concern over the abuse of minorities is an extension of abuses 
with law enforcement profiling through on-the-street interaction, traffic stops, and video 
surveillance. See id.  While the chilling effects of government surveillance are of paramount 
concern, courts in the immigration context make  an interesting connection between 
surveillance and free will. In United States v. Aguilar, 883 F.2d 662 (9th Cir. 1989), for 
example, the court explicitly stated that an alien can be in constructive custody if under 
continuous surveillance immediately after entering the country. See id. at 681, 681 n.14. Indeed, 
the court reasoned that since the defendant had an opportunity to escape without detection, the 
defendant was not under constructive restraint. See id. at 683. To take this argument to its 
logical conclusion, the court is coupling individual autonomy with a lack of individualized 
government surveillance. Such immigration cases indicate that there may be more at stake in 
GPS surveillance than the chilling effect of a pervasive government overseer or freedom from 
the eyes of the government; some capacity of the freedom to act itself may be at risk as well. 
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IV. THE REASONABLE SOLUTION 
The legality of GPS surveillance is truly in the gray. The risk that 
another could observe a single vehicle‘s movements over the course 
of weeks or even months is nearly nonexistent, but by traveling on 
public roads drivers relinquish control of information relating to the 
vehicle‘s location. Law enforcement is capable of some long-term 
surveillance, indicating that GPS is merely increasing law 
enforcement efficiency. However, such activity is prohibitively 
expensive and continuous visual surveillance over a period of more 
than a few days is very difficult, which indicates that GPS truly adds 
something wholly beyond the capabilities of law enforcement. The 
information gathered is sensitive, but in light of our increasingly 
public society such information has become increasingly available to 
the public. Because GPS is so efficient, it is incredibly useful to law 
enforcement, but the potential social costs associated with unbridled 
employment of GPS tracking are quite alarming.  
What is to be done about this toss-up Fourth Amendment issue? 
Simple. Stop fighting the ―unreasonable‖ term of the Fourth 
Amendment and embrace it. Instead of focusing upon the binary 
holdings that rule that an activity is or is not a search—which 
generally leads to the equally binary solutions of requiring a warrant 
with probable cause or no warrant with absolutely no requisite level 
of justification—the Court should analyze the reasonableness of GPS 
tracking. While the Court‘s jurisprudence typically focuses upon 
reasonableness after declaring police activity a search, reasonableness 
case law allows for solutions to be tailor-made to the issue at hand. 
Specifically, it allows the Court to adjust the requisite level of 
suspicion to engage in a given activity,
150
 limit the scope of the 
 
 150. Under Terry v. Ohio and its progeny, the Court has held that police officers can 
warrantlessly stop civilians for a short time and/or frisk them in a limited fashion as long as 
they reasonably suspect that a suspect is (or has been) involved in criminal activity or that the 
suspect is armed and dangerous. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20, 30 (1968); United States v. 
Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 228–29 (1985) (extending Terry to include investigating past criminal 
activity). This rule is based on the balance of the government‘s interests in investigating crime 
and ensuring officer safety against the individual‘s freedom from physical invasions and to 
conduct her daily affairs without interference. Terry, 392 U.S. at 24–27; Hensley, 469 U.S. at 
229.  
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search,
151
 and dispose of judicial supervision before the Fourth 
Amendment activity is conducted.
152
 
The requisite level of justification required for police action is one 
facet to the reasonableness inquiry for which the Court typically uses 
two different standards.
153
 The familiar ―probable cause‖ standard 
requires the ―known facts and circumstances [to be] sufficient to 
warrant a man of reasonable prudence in the belief that contraband or 
evidence of a crime will be found. . . .‖154 In contrast, a useful 
articulation of the lower, ―reasonable suspicion‖ standard can be 
pared from the discussion in United States v. Cortez,
155
 where the 
Court stated that reasonable suspicion requires ―a particularized and 
objective basis for suspecting the particular person . . . of criminal 
activity,‖ based upon ―common sense conclusions about human 
behavior . . . . seen and weighed . . . by those versed in the field of 
law enforcement.‖156 Fundamentally, the reasonable suspicion 
standard requires objective reasons to believe that the suspect may be 
(or may have been) involved in criminal activity, but probable 
cause—the default under the Fourth Amendment157—requires that a 
reasonable officer believe evidence relating to criminal activity will 
actually be found, constituting a much higher standard.
158
 
 
 151. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 378-79 (1993) (holding that 
―squeezing, sliding and otherwise manipulating the contents of the defendant‘s pocket‖ that the 
officer already knew did not contain a weapon was unconstitutional because it exceeded the 
scope of a weapons frisk for safety reasons) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 152. See, e.g., Florida v. White, 526 U.S. 559, 566 (1999) (holding that the warrantless 
seizure of an automobile—i.e. a seizure without prior judicial approval—from a public area 
based upon probable cause was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment).  
 153. See, e.g., United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 882-83 (1975) (holding that 
for certain kinds of traffic stops with the border patrol, the circumstances of the stop must 
amount to the ―reasonable suspicion‖ level of justification in order to satisfy the reasonableness 
requirement of the Fourth Amendment). 
 154. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996). 
 155. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (1981). 
 156. See id. at 417–18.  
 157. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (stating the ―right of the people to be secure . . . against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause. . . .‖).  
 158. See also United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989) (stating that ―the level of 
suspicion required for [a stop based upon reasonable suspicion] is obviously less demanding 
than that for probable cause.‖). 
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Some legal commentators who have examined GPS tracking 
argue for the higher legal threshold of probable cause and an 
accompanying warrant. Hutchins, for example, advocates for a 
warrant to issue before any GPS tracking takes place, arguing that we 
should vigilantly fortify our right to privacy against the unnecessary 
encroachment of GPS surveillance.
159
 Few would argue with 
Hutchins sentiment regarding our Fourth Amendment rights, but the 
probable cause standard establishes a needlessly high threshold of 
justification. 
Reasonable suspicion, however, strikes a good balance.
160
 Such a 
standard inherently constitutes recognition of the strong yet opposing 
legal doctrines swirling around GPS tracking. Further, as a lower 
standard of proof reasonable suspicion maintains a high degree of 
utility for this powerful tool by authorizing its use earlier in the 
investigative phase. Most importantly, by requiring some degree of 
justification, reasonable suspicion reduces chilling effects and 
potential abuses of GPS tracking because the vast majority of the 
population will not be involved in the activities that would pique the 
interests of law enforcement to the level of reasonable suspicion.
161
  
 
 159. Hutchins, supra note 121, at 460–65. 
 160. See also Penney, supra note 143, at 528–29. 
 161. A more subtle solution could be derived from existing statutory law surrounding 
wiretap authorization for those still uneasy about the relatively low reasonable suspicion 
standard. In statutes regulating federal wiretap authorizations, law enforcement is required to 
show that ―normal investigative procedures have been tried and have failed or reasonably 
appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous . . . .‖ 18 U.S.C.S. § 2518(3)(c) 
(LexisNexis 2010). If law enforcement fails to carry that burden, then any evidence obtained is 
barred. 18 U.S.C.S. § 2515 (LexisNexis 2010). Courts have applied this statute to require ―that 
wiretaps are not used as the initial step in a criminal investigation.‖ United States v. Forrester, 
616 F.3d 929, 944 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 515 (1974)). 
But at least in the Ninth Circuit, it is not required that ―officials . . . exhaust every conceivable 
investigative technique before obtaining a wiretap.‖ Id. at 944 (citing United States v. 
Commito, 918 F.2d 95, 98–99 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Carneiro, 861 F.2d 1171, 1178 
(9th Cir. 1988)).  
 A similar requirement that law enforcement first try other methods of surveillance could be 
used in the context of GPS tracking. Such a prerequisite would provide more protection in 
many instances, as law enforcement would need to invest more time and effort in the case 
before jumping to GPS. By the same token, this standard would mitigate much of the cost-
saving advantage that early use of GPS tracking would give law enforcement and would have 
little effect on civilians at large, as most would be adequately protected by the reasonable 
suspicion standard.   
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Second, rather than require a warrant, a time limitation for GPS 
monitoring should be imposed. The warrant requirement is meant to 
ensure that the government does not infringe upon privacy without 
proper justification.
162
 In other words, the warrant requirement is 
meant to minimize unjustified intrusions into private life. A two-
week time limitation would assuage the concerns that arise from the 
lack of more careful pre-search examination. While this bright-line 
rule certainly would not provide the high level of protection as a 
neutral, detached magistrate, it would serve the same goal of limiting 
privacy encroachment by police officers. By restricting tracking time 
to two weeks, the rule will minimize the information accumulated by 
police officers (and therefore the unsettling information that can be 
derived therefrom), while also providing significant surveillance 
benefits for the government.
163
  
V. CONCLUSION 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is ever-evolving. At times, 
courts have emphasized individual control of information and the 
risks posed by other civilian‘s conduct. At others, the courts have 
analogized between the conduct at issue and contemporary practices. 
Further, courts have measured societal interests against the gains of 
more lax constitutional protection. Indeed, defining ―search‖ in a 
Fourth Amendment context is an amorphous, malleable concept. 
The analytic considerations surrounding warrantless GPS tracking 
(aside from installing a device on a vehicle) may be muddled, but at 
this juncture the proper solution is clear: warrantless monitoring for a 
two-week time period based on reasonable suspicion. Academically, 
philosophically, and practically, this compromise can accommodate 
legal doctrine, maintain respect for the individual, and maximize the 
 
 162. See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 586, (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13–14 (1948)). 
 163. It should be noted that Justice Scalia flatly rejected this kind of a bright-line rule under 
the Fourth Amendment during the United States v. Jones oral arguments. Transcript of Oral 
Argument at 51, United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012) (No. 10-1259). However, the 
Court has imposed a time limitation in the context of warrantless arrests—another Fourth 
Amendment issue. County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56 (1991) (holding that 
having a hearing to determine probable cause under forty-eight hours following a warrantless 
arrest is a presumptively reasonable delay). 
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benefits that technology has bestowed upon law enforcement. 
However, this solution requires a very precise balance—removing the 
protections of reasonable suspicion or hiking them to probable cause 
with a warrant would ignore the subtleties this issue presents and will 
miss the mark.  
 Unfettered GPS tracking could lead to a ubiquitous government 
presence in individual lives. Such a turn of events should certainly be 
prevented, but tracking must also be considered against a backdrop of 
security. Luckily, the two values Americans cherish most—
individual autonomy and safety—can be accommodated. 
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